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The studies of Church’s thesis (further denoted as CT) are slowly gaining 
their intensity. Since different formulations of the thesis are being proposed, it is 
necessary to state how it should be understood. The following is the formulation 
given by Church: 
[CT] The concept of the effectively calculable function1 is identical with the 
concept of the recursive function. 
The conviction that the above formulation is correct, finds its confirmation in 
Church’s own words:2 
We now define the notion, […] of an effectively calculable function of 
positive integers by identifying it with the notion of a recursive function of 
positive integers […]. 
Frege thought that the material equivalence of concepts is the approximation 
of their identity. For any concepts F, G: 
 Concept F is identical with concept G iff ∀x (Fx  ≡ Gx) 3. 
The symbol Fx should be read as “object x falls under the concept F”. The 
contemporary understanding of the right side of the above equation was 
dominated by the first order logic and set theory.  
                                                 
1Unless stated otherwise, the term function in this work always means function defined on the 
set natural numbers, that is, on natural numbers including zero. I would rather use the term 
concept than the term notion. Instead of if and only if  will be used iff.     
2This fragment comes form the seventh paragraph of the work ‘Unsolvable Problem of 
Elementary Number Theory’. It is similar in the first paragraph although the formulation of this 
definition occurs in the third paragraph:’ a positive integer function will be named effectively 
calculable if it is λ-definable in the sense of the second paragraph below’. 
3Frege was not supposed to distinguish the signs ≡ and = (identity and equivalence). In his 
work of 1879 he used the sign ≡, while in the writings of 1893 and 1903 he used =. See: Jan H. 
Alnes, ‘Sense and Basic Law V in Frege’s Logicism’, Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic, 
4(1999), pg. 1-30, in particular s. 4.  
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This leads to regard (after Frege) the proposition expressing the material 
equivalence of concepts as identical with the proposition stating the equality of 
their extensions (sets).4  
In the present work, the term hypothesis is understood as a proposition valued 
absolutely as true or false. However, the current state of investigations precludes 
precise determination of such values. Since the times of Popper, falsifiability is 
the criterion determining whether a theory or a hypothesis is scientific. Here, 
falsifiability will be understood broader as a possibility to prove the falsity of 
propositions. Although this is a necessary feature of empiricity, it is not 
sufficient for mathematical hypotheses fall under such category as well (e.g., 
continuum hypothesis). A hypothesis will be named empirical when it possesses 
empirical content. Empirical content of a hypothesis (theory) is a set of base 
propositions (observational) that can be deduced from the hypothesis by the use 
of logical methods. An observational proposition is a proposition whose logical 
value can be determined based on sensorial cognition (confrontation with 
reality). Such propositions contain observational terms. Their truth is established 
by contingent properties of the Universe, the world in which we live. From the 
epistemological point of view, one can say that these are a posteriori 
propositions.  
 
1. A sample of the views on the empirical character of CT 
Of the “fathers of calculability”, Emil Post supported the understanding of CT 
as an empirical hypothesis. In his three page article “Finite Combinatory 
Processes. Formulation I.” he gives his analysis of the process of calculation. 
Although independent, this method is almost identical with the Turing’s 
analysis. Post’s article reached the editorial office of Journal of Symbolic Logic 
on October 7, 1936 and, although it was published earlier, it is posterior to the 
famous work of the English logician. In the last chapter Post writes:    
  The writer expects the present formulation to turn out to be logically 
equivalent to recursiveness in the sense of the Gödel-Church 
development.[…] Its purpose, however, is not only to present a system of a 
certain logical potency but also, in its restricted field, of psychological 
fidelity. In the latter sense wider and wider formulations are contemplated. 
On the other hand, our aim will be to show that all such are logically 
reducible to formulation I. We offer this conclusion at the present moment as 
a working hypothesis. And to our mind such is Church’s identification of 
effective calculability with recursiveness. 
                                                 
4 In Frege’s system, the transition from the identity of the extension of notions to the identity of 
notions was possible based on the so called Basic Law V. This law was contradictory within 
Frege’s system of the second order logic. Remarks on that matter are given in S. Shapiro, 
‘Foundations without Foundationalism’, Oxford 2002, pg. 16-17.  
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Here footnote number eight appears:  
[…] Actually the work already done by Church and others carries this 
identification considerably beyond the working hypothesis stage. But to mask 
this identification under a definition hides the fact that a fundamental 
discovery in the limitations of the mathematicizing power of Homo Sapiens 
has been made and blinds us to the need of its continual verification. 
And further on in the main text:  
Out of this hypothesis […] flows a Gödel-Church development. The success 
of the above program would, for us, change this hypothesis not so much to a 
definition or to an axiom but to a natural law. 
The excerpts given above indicate that Post maintained the following: 
– CT is neither a definition nor an axiom.5 
– CT is a working hypothesis that demands continuing verification. 
– CT was elevated by Church and others to the level of a valid law of nature.  
– CT limits the (psychological) mathematical possibilities of man.  
This understanding did not accord with that of Church. For him, the thesis 
was a definition. Therefore, in his review of the cited paper of Post, Church 
criticizes the understanding of CT as a working hypothesis that requires constant 
verification. He thinks that the notion of the effective calculability does not have 
precise sense and as a result CT does not have precise meaning as a working 
hypothesis. Calculability with the use of a machine (limited by the condition of 
finiteness) is supposed to be an adequate representation of an intuitive notion6. 
Then, according to Church, the need to assume such a hypothesis disappears. 
However, he did not relate to Post’s view expressed in the quote cited. This is 
one of the few Church’s comments on CT aside from the article in which it was 
formulated. It seems that later on he modified his standpoint in that matter. In 
1940, he wrote the following7: 
Now a formal definition of effective calculability, for functions of positive 
integers, has been proposed by the author, […] and the adequacy of this 
definition to represent the empirical notion (A.O) of an effective calculation 
finds strong support in the recent result of Turing.  
It is not clear what kind of definition CT is for him. In Reference 168 of his 
Introduction to mathematical Logic he distinguishes four types of definitions 
within logic: definitions that are abbreviations (a kind of synthetic definitions?), 
                                                 
5It is not clear how Post understood definitions. It seems that he understood them as what is 
sometimes called synthetic definition. Post’s graduate student, Martin Davies, thought like his 
professor: ‘[…] how can we ever excluded the possibility of our being presented, some day 
(perhaps by some extraterrestrial visitors), with a (perhaps extremely complex) device or “oracle” 
that “computes” a noncomputable (in the sense of Turing; A.O.) function?’, M. Davis, 
‘Computability and unsolvability’, Dover, New York 1982, pg. 11.  
6This review was published in: Journal of Symbolic Logic, 2 (1937) pg. 43. 
7See: Alonzo Church, ‘The Concept of Random Sequence’, Bulletin of the American 
Mathematical Society, 46(1940), pg. 133. 
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definitions that explicate the notation of the language (similar to real 
definitions)8, semantic rules (metalanguage) that establish the interpretation of 
the system’s language9, definitions that extend the language of a formal system 
(they are a part of object language and must fulfil the conditions of correctness 
formulated by Leśniewski). It seems that CT can fall only under the second 
category of definitions due to the fact that Church attempted to provide 
justification of his thesis. If this is true, the opposition of Church towards Post’s 
approach to CT seems strange because these two positions with regard to the 
character of CT could be reconciled.  
Hao Wang was another logician with strongly philosophical inclinations who 
pointed out the empirical character of CT. In the book, A survey of Mathematical 
Logic, he writes10: 
It does seem that in the concept of effectiveness, there is a core in mechanical 
terms, and at the same time, there is an idealization which brings to infinity. 
Something which a physical object can do reliably and systematically would 
seem to be effective, no matter whether we understand the process or not. It 
would then appear to be an empirical question whether all effective functions 
are general recursive. 
Thomas recalls a private conversation with Wang, in which the latter was 
supposed to say that the above quotation was aimed at making the empirical 
interpretation of CT probable and that he was not convinced of its correctness11. 
According to Wang, if the “empirical element” is removed (from the notion of 
effective calculability), the proof of CT is possible. If one takes CT with its 
empirical component, a real machine may be observed which computes a non 
recursive function. Thomas considers a hypothetical machine M that is supposed 
to compute a non recursive function. He points out that the machine M would 
have to have an infinite time of operation. This is due to the fact that each 
function of a finite domain of natural numbers is recursive and it demands 
infinite sampling time. Even if the “Zeno machine” is considered12, a 
mathematician would need to follow an infinitely long proof in order to 
demonstrate that it computes a non recursive function. These arguments seem to 
be appropriate with respect to the machine M that exists in reality. Wang gives 
an example of such function suggested to him by Specker: f(n)=0 when on the  
                                                 
8In his context, Chuch does not speak about syntactic definitions. Regarding the second kind of 
definitions he mentions real definitions. However, he does not use this term and remarks that he 
wishes to avoid associations and presuppositions connected with this term.  
9Church thought that one has to do with a formalized language as long as its interpretation is 
given. This idea is philosophically attractive but presently rarely respected. 
10Hao Wang, op. cit., pg. 87. 
11See: William J. Thomas, ‘Church’s Thesis and Philosophy’, unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Case Western Reserve University, 1972, pg. 22. 
12In regards to the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea. These machines perform the n+1 th step of an 
operation twice as fast as the n th step. 
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n-th day (counting from today, February 1, 2005, for instance) an earthquake 
occured in the world, f(n)=1 if it did not occur. It is not well known how the 
recursiveness or the non recursiveness of the function f could be demonstrated. 
Also, it is problematic that sensu stricto one does not deal with a function 
defined in the entire set of natural numbers and the existence of such function 
would have to be postulated through the assumption of the existence of platonic 
objects. Functions that are calculable by means of physical systems will be 
called p-computable13. 
The version of CT that accords with Wang’s view bears the name of the 
physical version of CT14: 
[PCT] Any function that is p-computable is also computable  
by a Turing machine (T-computable)15. 
A physical system mentioned above (real or potential) is defined by the 
following conditions: (1) its states occupy finite space, (2) its dynamics ends is 
real time, (3) dynamic is consistent with the laws of physics. 
Computability by means of such a system means the following16: 
A computing machine is any physical system whose dynamical evolution 
takes it from one of a set of ‘input’ states to one of a set of ‘output’ states. 
[…] The states are labeled in some canonical way, the machine is prepared in 
a state with given input label and then, following some motion, the output 
state is measured.  
In the approximation we consider a physical system that can be assumed to 
compute a function in the sense given by Deutsch. Also, it is assumed that the 
behavior of the system is causal. Rosen stipulates17 that in order to do theoretical 
science it is necessary to assume that one needs to simulate causal relationships 
occurring in physical (material) systems by the use of implications taking place 
between propositions which describe them. If the behavior of such a system is 
repeatable and it can be measured (observed), it is possible to seek a formal 
                                                 
13I have presented similar considerations in the following article: A. Olszewski, ‘Teza Churcha 
a platonizm’, Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce, 34(1999), pg. 96-100. 
14Kreisl’s version of the thesis states: The behavior of any discrete physical system evolving 
according to local mechanical laws is recursive. G. Kreisel, ‘Mathematical Logic’, [in:] ‘Lectures 
on Modern Mathematics’, Saaty (ed.), Wiley 1965, pg. 95-195. See Section 2.714. 
15As one can see, the concept of a recursive function disappears form CT in favor of Turing 
machines. This corroborates with the fact that Turing machines are associated with the class of 
partially recursive functions. For interesting information on that matter see: ‘A Speculative 
Church-Turing Theorem’, U. Boker, N. Dersowitz. This paper provides an interesting formulation 
of CT: All computational models are either equivalent or weaker with respect to Turing machines 
(it refers to Church’s formulation contained in the abstract published in 1935). As the authors 
postulate, the proof of CT is presented there.  
16D. Deutsch, ‘Quantum theory, Church-Turing principle and the universal quantum 
computer’, Proceedings of the Royal Society, Series A, 400(1985), pg. 97-117. 
17See R. Rosen, ‘Effective Processes and Natural Law’, [in:] ‘The Universal Turing Machine. 
A Half-Century Survey’, R. Herken (ed.), Springer, Wien, New York 1994, pg. 485- 498. 
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system (computably recursive) that would model this system. If such a system 
were found and it were possible to cross from the physical system to  
a hypothetical formal one and vice versa, the system could be regarded as  
a realization of a formal system (and the formal system as a simulation 
(representation of physical system). This can be shown in the following graph18: 
 
             Causality                                                             Implication (Algorithm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Functional dependencies between the physical system and its formal description 
 
If the arrows of the above graph are understood as functional dependences, a 
relation of modelling occurs between a given physical system and the formal 
system provided that the diagram commutes δ =  α ° β ° γ19. According to Fitz, 
PCT is an extension of CT. A thesis inverse to PCT also bears empirical 
character because it is possible that one of the recursive functions (partially 
recursive) is not computable by a physical system. PCT has led physicists to 
consider physical systems exceeding the possibilities of Turing machines. This 
comprises Zeno machines (accelerating)20, analog computation, quantum 
computation, quantum processes, machines utilizing relativistic effects, 
biological computation and others21.  
Robin Gandy must be also mentioned as a supporter of the empiricity of CT. 
He presents his concept in the work entitled “Church’s thesis and Principles for 
Mechanisms”22. In his writings, he reflects on the computability performed by a 
machine as understood in the 19th century sense. As an example he mentions the 
“Babbage’s Analytical Engine”. The following are the limitations of the term 
“machine”: a) finitism – analog machines are excluded from the consideration. 
                                                 
18Rosen, op. cit., pg. 491. 
19See: Hartmut Fitz, ‘Church’s Thesis. A Philosophical Critique of the Foundations of Modern 
Computability Theory’, Master’s Thesis, Berlin, 2001, s. 94. 
20The possibility of the existence of a physical system that performs an infinite number of steps 
(in its internal time) was supposed to be considered by Herman Weyl. P. H. Potgieter, ‘Zeno 
Machines and Hypercomputations’,  submitted to Elsevier Science. 
21For example see: P.H. Potgieter, op. cit.; J. Mycka, ‘Empiryczne aspekty teorii 
obliczalności’; Fitz, op. cit.; R. Penrose, ‘The Emperor’s New Mind’, Oxford Univ. Press 1989. 
22Robin Gandy, ‘Church’s Thesis and Principles for Mechanisms’, [in:] J. Barwise, H.J. 
Keisler, K. Kunen (eds.), “The Kleene Symposium’, North-Holland, 1980, pg. 123-148. 
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The only physical limitation is the lower limitation regarding atomic dimensions 
of the machine’s parts and the upper limitation regarding the velocity of  
propagation (velocity of light). b) discreteness – the process of computation can 
be recorded with discrete terms, c) determinism – the machine’s behavior is 
uniformly determined by its initial state.  
Gandy demands that his description of a machine fits for every device of this 
kind: mechanical, electrical and notional. He formulates four principles that will 
define the machines: (I) there is a set S of descriptions of the states of a machine. 
This set is a subset of hereditarily finite sets (HF) (built above an infinite set of 
labels) together with a well defined transition function; the three following 
principles impose limitations on S and on the transition function F:S→S; (II) a 
set theory level of machine construction is limited, that is ∃k (S ⊂ HFk); (III) for 
every description, there exists a limitation of the number of elements composing 
the machine; (IV) principle of local causality – every state belongs to a limited 
(local) former state. Gandy demonstrates that each function fulfilling these 
conditions (m-computable according to Kreisel) is computable by a Turing 
machine. Should any of these conditions be weakened, the machine will 
compute any function – it will admit of the free will.  
[MCT] Any function that is computable by a finite, discrete and 
deterministic machine (m-calculable), is computable by a Turing 
machine (T-computable). 
MCT can be rigorously proven and it is a mathematical theorem. Its empirical 
character consists in the assumption that each machine must fulfill the conditions 
(I-IV). However, this is a next Thesis23. Gandy formulates his argument as 
follows: 
[G1] Gandy’s Thesis: Any discrete, deterministic and mechanical device fulfills 
conditions (I-IV). 
[G2] Gandy’s Theorem: Any function computable by a device fulfilling 
conditions (I-IV) is also T-computable.  
[G3] Conclusion: MCT24. 
Generally, it can be stated that if this formulation of CT has a strict proof, 
there exists a prior thesis, that has been accepted intuitively without a strict 
proof. In the subject literature, these assumptions bear the name of the Central 
Theses in support of CT.  
Kleene has formulated two additional heuristic arguments in favor of CT. The 
first of them (a lack-of-counterexample argument) says that CT is true due to the 
fact that each effectively computable function as well as each effective operation 
defining a function from other functions turned out to be general recursive. 
                                                 
23The phenomenon of the theses is popular within science. Shagrir points out that there exists a 
problem with the interpretation of Gandy’s machine. See Shagrir, op. cit., 234-236.  
24See Gandy, op. cit., pg. 126 and 123.  
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Various functions and their respective classes were investigated. It was the aim 
of these investigations to cover all known types of functions. Research methods 
preclude the situation in which it would be possible to find an effectively 
calculable function which cannot be converted into a recursive function by the 
use of these methods. Kreisel25 gave an example of such a function. A 
constructively correct formal system of arithmetic is given and its proofs are 
constructively enumerated. A function f(n) is defined where f(n)=0 when the 
conclusion of the nth proof either does not have an existential form or it does but 
the proof does not specify the witness for this quantification: f(n)=(m+1) when 
the conclusion of the proof has an existential form and the proof specifies m as a 
witness. It turned out that the function is mechanically computable. This 
example is interesting (as Oddifreddi notices after Kreisel) there occurs ‘the 
passage between a  formal derivation […] and the corresponding mental, namely 
the proof expressed by the derivation’. Odifreddi thinks that this definition does 
not even make sense from the point of view of the set theory26. A Polish 
logician, Józef Pepis, who studied CT corresponded with Church on that matter, 
writes on the lack-of-counterexample argument27: 
In regards to this hypothesis, the above mentioned authors (Church and 
Turing; emphasis by A.O.) do not provide any convincing arguments in its 
support but they rely only on an empirical fact (emphasis by A.O.) that there 
are no known “calculable” functions except for those that are recursive. […] 
Due to such state of affairs, the question of the complete solubility of the 
problem of decidability for the system of the narrower functional calculus 
remains open. (emphasis by A.O).  
The second of Kleene’s arguments (called the formulation convergence 
argument) invokes a certain kind of stability of the effectively computable 
function. Various formal expressions of this notion turned out to be equivalent. 
Kreisel stresses that, despite of the equivalence of formulations, neither the 
systematical error in these approaches nor the fact that the notion of interest 
(effective computability) does not appear among the equivalent notions cannot 
be excluded28.  
In a summary, it can be stated that the three versions of Church’s Thesis: CT, 
PCT and MCT result in consequences containing observational terms. These are 
concepts, physical systems and machines, respectively. The second and partially 
the third have designates clearly belonging to the Universe. Concepts - 
mysterious objects functioning in the mind are the designates of the first term. 
                                                 
25Kreisel, op. cit., Section 2.35. 
26P. Odifreddi, ‘Kreisel’s Church’, [in:] ‘Kreiseliana’, P.Odiferddi (ed.). AK Peters 1996, pg. 
389-415; in particular 399-400. 
27Józef Pepis, ‘O zagadnieniu rozstrzygalności w zakresie węższego rachunku funkcyjnego’, 
Lwów 1937, pg. 169-170. 
28See Kreisel, op. cit., Section 2.715. 
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Consequently, the observational propositions for h-computable functions have 
slightly different character. Observation will be the introspection and the 
analysis of notions. Its sensorial character consists in the necessary emergence of 
the (formal) description of the computation of a function. Kant has denoted it as 
sensorial forms of eyewitness, in particular, in the form of space. In general, if 
one takes any object (algorithm, physical system, finite machine) and one proves 
that a function computable by such an object is recursive, one obtains partial 
confirmation of an appropriate version of CT. However, to find a 
counterexample (in any of the three domains)  will falsify an appropriate version 
of CT. This implies that no man (physical system, machine) should not be able 
to compute effectively the values of a non recursive function (for any argument).  
 
2. Turing’s and Church’s Arguments in favor of CT 
The justification of CT given by Church himself appears in the seventh 
paragraph of “An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory”29. Also, 
this is the second argument in favor of CT. 
 
[C1] Definition: A function f is effectively computable iff there exists a formal 
system F in which it is weakly representable; namely, one argument function f is 
weakly representable in a certain system F iff there exists formula A in the 
language of system F such that for each n ∈ N: ├F A(n)=m   iff   f(n) = m .30 
 
[C2] Central Church Thesis:31 The sets of axioms and rules of inference are 
recursively enumerable and each rule of inference is recursive, it means that 
there is a recursive function g  such, that g(n,x) = y, where y is (the Gödel 
number of) the formula that is obtained (in F) from formulas (premises) coded 
by number x, by the use of the nth rule of system F. 
 
[C3] Conclusion (CT): Each function that is effectively computable is 
recursive.  
 
This argument is of deductive character. CT emerges logically out of the 
premises accepted. However, Church does not provide any justification for 
[C2]32.  
                                                 
29Journal of Mathematics, 58(1936), pg. 345-363. Reprinted in Davis’ antology,  pg. 88-107. 
30Oron Shagrir, op.cit., Minds and Machines, 12(2002) demands that the function be 
representable. However, this condition is not satisfactory because each function is representable in 
a contradictory system and  CT would be consequently false. 
31The name comes from: W. Sieg, ‘Step by Recursive Step: Church’s Analysis of Effective 
Calculability’, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 3(1997), pg. 154-180. 
32See W. Sieg, op. cit., pg. 165. 
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Let us assume that there exists effectively computable and non-recursive 
function f. Let us attach all propositions of the form P(n,m) to the axioms 
of a rich enough arithmetic AR in the way that: ├AR’ P(n,m) iff  f(n)=m 
where P is a new binary predicate. The axiomatic of the system will 
remain effective as well as the system. Since no new principle is 
enclosed, the set of rules is effectively enumerable and each rule remains 
effective. The function f would be weakly representable in the 
hypothetical arithmetic AR’. In such a case, CT is clearly false. As a 
result, one cannot exchange in [C2] the word “recursive” for “effective”. 
In spite of the low probability, it is possible that there exists an effective 
and non recursive function. Consequently, Post, who interpreted CT in the 
categories of cognitive psychology thought that in order to verify the 
thesis it would be necessary to investigate all possible ways human mind 
might formulate a finite process33. An exhaustive analysis of time-space 
possibilities of symbolization and symbolic “manipulation” by man is 
necessary34. This analysis regards man as present in the Reality – the 
Universe. Kreisel spoke in a similar fashion as he suspected that in order 
to evaluate CT in regard to functions computable by a human being (h-
computable), one has to construct a formal system that encompasses the 
entire mathematics35. Post postulated the formulation of the theory of 
conception of concepts. It seems that this science would be of empirical 
character and account for real properties of human mind. While writing 
on Gödel, Gandy speaks similarly36: 
Gödel’s objection (that intelligence works sometimes non-mechanically 
though perhaps effectively; A. O) can only be properly justified by a theory 
of intelligence. As he admits, our present understanding of the human mind is 
far from being penetrating enough for the construction of such theory. For 
this purpose the knowledge provided by introspection, the history of ideas, 
experimental psychology, neurophysiology and artificial intelligence seems 
meager indeed. One can only keep an open mind. 
The Gödel’s objection concerned CT in a sense that he denied its 
psychological interpretation. He thought that the results obtained with CT need 
                                                 
33See Fitz, op. cit., ss. 37-39. See E. Post, Appendix of ‘Absolutely Unsolvable Problems and 
Relatively Undecidable Propositions’, reprint [in:] Davis’ anthology, pp. 340-433. In references 1 
and 9, Post stresses the necessity to investigate all ways of symbolization by man. 
34See Post, ‘Appendix’, pg. 426 
35G. Kreisel, ‘Which number theoretic problems can be solved in recursive progressions on Π11 
– paths through Ο?’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 37(1972), pg. 311-334, particularly pg. 316. 
According to Kreisel, the existence of such system does not contradict Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem. 
36Gandy, op. cit., pg. 124. 
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to be interpreted as limiting the possibilities of pure formalism in mathematics37. 
For him, the Turing’s analysis was a sufficient support for CT. He insisted on 
the interpretation of CT in the following shape: 
[GCT] Each function computable by a mechanical procedure is 
computable by a Turing machine (T-computable)38. 
However, Gödel maintained that there exists communication among people 
that involves the content (sense) of expressions and not only the combinatoric 
(time-space) relations between combinations of signs39. 
The goal of the above consideration was to demonstrate that Church 
arbitrarily assumed [C2] while in place of [C2], [C2’] should be used:  
[C2’]  Relation of provability of any system fulfilling [C1] is recursive.  
Since the truth of such premise depends on real properties of any possible and 
appropriate systems, it has an empirical character.  
Let us now investigate the Turing’s argument taken from the article ‘On 
Computable Numbers with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’40: 
[T1] Central Turing Thesis: a human computer (computor) obeys three 
limiting conditions. 
[T2] Turing’s Theorem: Any function that is computable by a computor 
obeying the three limitations is computable by means of a Turing machine.  
[T3] Conclusion (CT): each function computable by a computor, is computable 
by a Turing machine41.  
The three conditions mentioned are: determinism (each configuration of the 
computational process determines strictly the next step of calculations), 
limitation (this regards the number of directly recognizable symbolic 
configurations and the number of machine’s internal states), locality (only 
directly observable configurations can be altered while the distance of newly 
observed configurations form those observed directly is limited).  
There is a certain empirical motive in Turing’s analysis of computability by 
man (it turned out to be very convincing for Gödel) that he assumed to be [T1] 
in his argumentation. The limitation imposed on the computor have to 
correspond to real limitations imposed by nature on man who performs 
computations. Is it really so? Gödel has criticized Turing’s analysis with respect 
to the finite number of the computor’s internal states. Gödel pointed out that 
                                                 
37See Postscriptum in Davis’ antology, pg. 71-73 
38See Hao Wang, ‘From Mathematics to Philosophy’, Routledge & Keagan, New York, 1974, 
pg. 84. 
39K. Gödel, ‘Über eine bisher noch nicht benützte Erweiterung des finiten Standpunktes’, 
Dialectica, 12(1958), pg. 280-287. In his conversation with Wang, Godel pointed out that two 
premises need to be added to Turings’s argument for correctness: 1. No matter independent mind 
exists; 2. The brain functions as a digital computer. See Wang, op. cit., pg. 326.  
40Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, (2)42 (1936), ss. 230-265. Reprint [in:] 
Davis, pp. 115-154. 
41Shagrir, op. cit. pp. 224-226. 
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although the number of these states is finite, their number approaches infinity 
because mind is of its nature dynamical and not static42. This objection of Gödel 
is clearly of empirical origin for it refers to factual properties of mind. Currently, 
it is being stressed that the mechanistic assumption is presupposed by Turing’s 
analysis43. 
 
 
                                                 
42 See Davis, op. cit., pg. 73. 
43 See Fitz, op. cit., pg. 22. 
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